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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEOX ARD E. HILL,

vs.
Z,\ I ,E CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

I
I

Case Xo.
12136

Brief of Defendant-Respondent

NATURE OF CASE
Tins is an action based upon a claim by plaintiff,

Luinard E. Hill, to recover wages, vacation pay, mov1''/.i expenses and an incentive cash award from defend:111t

Zale Corporation.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
Defendant Zale Corporation's motion to dismiss the
,t1011 \\as granted, the court having found that the de1

fendant is a corporation duly organized and existtr,
under the laws of the State of Texas and is not suhjt,·
to service of process within the State of Utah.
·

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant submits that the judgment of !lit
trial court granting defendant's motion to dismiss shouk
be affirmed.

STATE.MENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant, Leonard C. Hill (hereinaftu
"Hill") is a former employee of Zale-Anchorage, lne.
an Alaska Corporation (hereinafter "Zale-Anchor
age") , and a wholly owned subsidiary of Zale Corpora·
tion, a Texas Corporation (hereinafter "Zale"). (R.11'
Hill brought suit against Zale based upon th(
claimed wrongful deduction of $1546.81 from a termin:i·
tion wage settlement ( R. 1, No. 4) ; failure to pay an in·
centiYe cash award in the amount of $100.00 (R. i. Second Cause of Action, Paragraph No. 3) ; failure to pa,1
for vacation time not taken, in the amount of $666.611.
(R. 2, Third Cause of Action, Paragraph No. 3); anc
failure to pay moving expenses after termination in the
amount of $469.40. ( R. 3, Fourth Cause of Action
Paragraph No. 3), all of which occurred in Anchorage
Alaska, during the term of his employment with Zale
Anchorage.
2

1•:;1L·l1 cause upon which complaint is had is the re,1ill lil. transactions within the State of Alaska by and
:·( l 11 Ll'll I l ill and Zale-Anchorage. ( H. 1 through H. 3).
Zaic is the parent corporate entity of numerous
011ned subsidiaries engaged in the business of re"lil mnchandising. Coordination of actiYities of all sub,11!i:; ril's in order to achieve economy of scale is effected
1r1 •11gh 1arious unincorporated divisions of Zale.

Zaic itself is neither organized nor qualified to do
in the States of Alaska or Utah (R. 11), al,Ji,111gh
is organized as an Alaskan Cor:·:1ralion a11d although there are various "Zale" stores in
l 1:tl . each of which is a distinct and separate Utah Corp11ratiun. ( R. 11).
I I ill sought to maintain his action in the District
(r111rL of Salt Lake County upon the basis of service of
!''"1ccss made upon Richard Hankin, an officer only of
111 unincorporated division of Zale, in Salt Lake City,

rtah.

Zale moved to dismiss the action for failure to state
· claim upon which relief can be granted; that Zale is
;11 1l subject to service of process within the State of
l'!ah; and that Zale had not been properly served. The
urt g-ranted Zale's motion on the basis that Zale is not
,,li,1l'd to service of process in Utah.
•

1

\ rlwreupon this appeal was taken.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DECISION OF THE LO\VER COl'H!
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UPON THE llASI.'
OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO SUSTAI\
THE BURDEN OF PROOF \VITH REGARL
TO
THE
DEFENDANT'S
AC'l'IVITm
\VITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH.
A . .Zale' s .Motion to Dismiss was properly treate1;
as a .Motion for Summary Judgment and proper·
ly granted owing to Hill's failure to show a gen·
uine issue as to any material fact.
Rule 12 (b) U.R.C.P., 1953, provides in part that:
"If, on a motion asserting the defense
( 6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to stalt
a claim which relief can be granted, matters uul
side the pleadings are presented to and not e"·
eluded by the court, the motion shall be treated a1
one for summary judgment and disposed of
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be girtr.
reasonable opportunity to present all mat:.rial
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 56 (b) U.R.C.P., 1953, provides that:
"A party against whom a claim ... _is asserted
... , may, at any time, move with or without.sup·
porting affidavits for a summary judgment mhii
favor ... "
And subparagraph (c) of that Rule provides that
"The adverse party prior to the day
may serve opposing affidavits. The .iudgmrn
4

•

be rendered forthwith if the pleadi1tgs, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
gcuuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
rnonng party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Zale.smotion to dismiss (R. 9) was based upon (1)
1ailure uf' the complaint to state a claim upon which relief cau lie granted, ( 2) the fact that Zale is a Texas
l ur11oration not subject to service of process in Utah,
:i 1 improper service, ( 4) the affidavit of Ben A. Lip·h>. President of Zale Corporation.
The form of the motion, together with the affidavit
matters outside the pleading" which was presented
111 an<l not excluded by the court, suffices to cause the
111Ptio11 to be treated as one for summary judgment, pur'u:mt tu llule 56, U.R.C.P., as previously noted.
ThP affidavit aforesaid, ( R. 11), states that "Zale

Corporation is a Texas Corporation ... not qualified to
jl) business in the State of Utah and does not do business
i11 that
failed to rebut the affidavit of Lipshy
liy counter-affidavit or otherwise.
This court examined a similar failure in Dupler v.
l'utcs, IO Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 ( 1960):
". . . \Vhere the moving party's evidentiary material is in itself sufficient and the opposing party
fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when he is
presumably in a position to do so, the courts
should be justified in concluding that no genuine
ol' fact is present, nor would one be present

5

at the trial. [Citing 99 Univ. Pa. L. Re\'. 21"
223 ( 1950) .]
.
"Upon a motion for summary judgment, tht
courts. ought to recognize, as a minimum, that t1,
opposmg party produce some evidentiary mattt•
in
of the movant' s case or specifr 1;,
an affidavit the reason why he cannot do '50
[Citing 99 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 212, 228.]
"'Vhere ... the materials presented by the rnoi.
ing party are sufficient to entitle him to a directec
verdict and the opposing party fails either to of.
fer counter-affidavits or other materials that
a credible issue or to show that he has evidentr
not then available, summary judgment may
rendered for the moving party." [Citing 6 Moore.
Federal Practice ( 2d Ed.) p. 2067; Jam es ;·
Honaker Drilling, Inc., 10 Cir. 254 F.2d 702.
706.J
Notwithstanding that Hill made use of discovery
procedures (R. 4 through R. 8, R. 12 through R. 16) t11
determine (Brief of plaintiff-appellant, pp. 2-7 passim
that "the conclusion is ... inescapable that Zale Corpo·
ration is 'doing business' in Utah" (Brief, supra at P·
14), the District Court was not so convinced.
Justice Callister of this court has approved author·
ity which states that:
"So long as the party opposing the motion (for
summary judgment] has full
to the
-as normally he. will through the d1sco,:ery
cedure-the motion should be granted if he . ·.
failed to show any genuine issue as to a
fact." Fox v. AUstate Ins. Co., 22 Utah 2d
453 P.2d 701 (1969) (dissenting opinion),

6

;3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
Procedure, 1232.2, p. 114 and Rolack v. [; nder1cuod, ( C.A.10, 19()5) 340 F.2d 816, 819.

The majority opinion in /!'ox v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
, 111 )111, based its reversal of the lower court order grant111g summary judgment on the basis that assertions in an
affid1ffit should not be the sole basis of granting "sum11wr.r judgment simply because there could not be a
lOtlllter-affidavit filed, particularly where the assertions
11mild be tried as issues before a jury .. , Fox v. Allstate
fos. Co., supra at p. 704.
The instant case presented the question of jurisdiclion of the court, a question of law properly decided by
thl' court. In addition, the plaintiff had apparently sat1,fied himself that the answers to questions propounded
111 discoYery proceedings would convince the court that
l'1Tice was proper. It should be noted that submission
11!' the interrogatories and request for admissions (R. 4
tu H. 8) followed the submission of the motion to disllliss with attached affidavit (R. 9 to R. 11) and that the
111cstions were designed to refute the statement contain1.d in the affidavit. This they failed to do, as shown by
the resulting Order of the lower court granting defend.lilt's motion to dismiss. ( R. 18).
1

1

B. The trial court based its decision on oral argument which does not appear of record, and
upon the pleadings and evidence .
.. 111 reviewing a case ... where issues of fact are
inrnlYe<l and there are no findings of fact, we do
not reYiew the facts, but assume that the trier of

7

the facts
them in accord with its decisiu
and we aff1rm the decision if from the evidence
would be reasonable to support it." Western G
Appliances v. Servel, Inc., 123 Utah 229 ·1;:
P.2d 950 (1953) citing J.llower v. McCarthy
Utah I, 245 P.2d
226 (1952).
' ..

The Brief of plaintiff-appellant Hill sets forth n
tensive factual allegations in support of Hill's positior
none of which appears of record: " ... arrangements ha,:
been made by Zale Corporation to transfer [Hil!J 1,
Utah." (Brief, p. 3); " ... defendant maintains [inSa1
!'permanent and established basis." (emphasis supplied
!.. Lake County] ... an officer and managing agent on'.
(Brief, p. 10); " ... it is established that [the agent1
job ... must certainly necessitate control over corpora!t
affairs, [etc.]." ( Hdef, pp. 10-11); "At the hearing ..
Defendant's counsel appealed to the court ... that (dt
nial of the motion to dismiss] would ... subject [Zak
to the regulatory and taxing statutes of fifty states.
(Brief p. 12); " ... it is obvious that [the agent) is fur·
thering the main business enterprise of Zale Corporation
in Utah ... " (Brief, p. 14) ; "the power and prerogafor
is retained somewhere within the maze of Zale's corpo·
rate structure ... " (Brief, p. 15) ; "It is obvious ... that
the 'wholly-owned subsidiaries' are merely parts of an
integrated marketing operation . . . " (Brief, P· rn.
" ... Zale Corporation ... determined ... such matter'
as wage settlements, sales promotion and incentive pro
grams, vacation pay, and moving expenses." (Brie'..:.
17) ; " ... employees of the Zale stores are under drrel
supervision ... of an executive officer of Zale Corpora·
1

8

tio11 ... l Brief, p. 22) ; '' ... the facts establish a high <leof activity in Utah by Zale Corporation .... " ( llrief,

l1· 2.i,); "The almost complete and autonomous control

nrer the affairs of its subsidiaries retained and exerted
by Zale Corporation in effect makes the subsidiaries
nierely the alter ego of Zale Corporation." (Brief, p.
It' these assertions had been proven to the satisfaction of the lower court, the necessity of this Appeal
11ould have been obviated.
"In any event, this court cannot consider facts statul iu the briefs which may be true but absent in the offi1·ial record." Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385
P.2d 154 ( 1963), citing Cooper v. J.i'oresters UnderJ.'l'itcrs, Inc., 123 Utah 215, 257 P.2d 540 (1953).
The order granting defendant's motion to dismiss
1wites that the court heard oral argument of respective
rnunsel, and it may be assumed that counsel for Hill
raised and was heard on all of the factual agreements set
forth in his brief.None of it, however, appears of record.

"Judgments of courts are presumed to be correct
if nothing in the record appears to the contrary,
an<l all doubts are resolved in their favor. The
r ccord on appeal in this case being devoid of any
and all evidence, it must be assumed that the proceedings in the court below established a sufficient basis to support and justify the court's findings, conclusions and Judgment. Watkins v.
Simonds, supra, citing Baine v. Beckstead, 10
lT tab 2d 4, 347 P .2d 554 ( 1959) ; and J
v.
Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246,
Peoples J.i'inancc
272 P.2d 171 ( 1954).
9

As additional evidence in support of his position.
Hill cites from his complaint allegations which "indicatt
that the defendant, rather than the individual Zale
Stores, claims the authority and/or the prerogatire to
withhold amounts from wage settlements lcitation
omitted} and that the defendant rather than the individual Zale Stores retains and exercises the authority to
determine such matters as sales promotion and incentire
programs by employees [citation omitted], vacation pay
(citation omitted], and payment of moving expenm
when employees are transferred (citation omittedj.
(Brief of plaintiff-appellant pp. 6-7). These contentions
were considered by the lower court in arriving at its determination to grant the motion to dismiss, and found
wanting.
" ... if the summary judgment procedure is to be
effective, it must be held that when adequate
proof is submitted in support of the motion, the
pleadings are not sufficient to raise an issue of
fact." Dupler v. Yates, supra, citing Asbill .\:
Snell, Summary Judgments under the Federal
Rules, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1143, 1155 (1953);
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Proce·
<lure 82.

POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANT·
ED DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT CORPORA·
TION'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE
GROUND THAT THE CORPORATION IS

10

\OT SL'BJECT TO SERVICE OF PROCESS
\\Tl'IllN THE STATE OF UTAH.

Hill points out a number of situations in which
'"nice may be had on a corporation, pursuant to Rule
11e) (4), U.R.C.P. (llrief of plaintiff-appellant pp. 8:1:. He lluotes first that service may be had "by deliver111g a copy ... to an officer, a managing or general
ageut." llut continuing the language of the rule, "or to
rill// other agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receiYe service of process ... " (emphasis added) . No
L·ndcnce was adduced, that appears of record, to indicate that Zale had any agent authorized by appointment
11r law to receive or accept service of process.
Appellant says that "(t]he second situation is '[i]f
no such officer or [managing or general] agent can be
found in the county in which the action is brought;'
1enice may then be had ... 'upon any such officer or
agent or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk,
or other agent having the management direction, control
rd' any property of such corporation ... with [sic] the
,\ate (emphasis added).' " Hill failed to show that there
any officer or agent within the State of Utah who has
111anagement, direction or control of any property of
Zale within the State of Utah, and no such showing ap:1ears of record although appellant had the opportunity
ru make such a showing.
Finally, "[i)n the situation where the defendant
1Jrporation is 'doing business,' which is something more
·han owning property, the legislature has made ser,·ice

1

11

easiest of all; it may be 'then upon the person doing Slll
business or in charge of ... [the] place of business.'"
Hill failed to produce any evidence sufficient :
convince the court that Zale was doing business withi
the state, as witness the order granting defendant's m
tion to dismiss.
Appellant allows that service may not be had "upuL
a mere employee of a foreign corporation nor upon a:
agent who was merely temporarily within the state .
(Brief, pp. 9-10), and cites as authority for the prop11·
sition, W. L. Beard v. White,
Addison Asso
Inc., 8 Utah 2d 424, 336 P .2d 125 ( 1959), and Westm

Gas Appliances v. Servel, supra.

The Beard case, supra, was an action to quiet tit!,
to mining claims located within the State of Utah. Tht
only question was whether the person served at the min·
ing claim site was a suitable person to receive serrice o!
process. This court ruled that he was not. The insta11!
case did not present the trial court the relatively easy
decision of who may be served since it was not a foregont
conclusion that Zale is doing business within the State
as was vVhite, Green & Addison Assoc. Inc.
In Wes tern Gas Appliance, supra, this court felt
that regular, infrequent trips to this state by a sales man·
ager coupled with "general promotion and supervision
of the business" of Servel distributorships was not doing
business such as would suffice to permit service of sum·
mons upon that person.

12

Appellant contends (Brief, supra, p. IO) that
Heard, 81lpra, and Wills v. National 1llineral Co., 176
Ukla. 19:3, 55 P.2d 449, 453, 454 ( 1936) stand as authority for the proposition that Zale should be subject
to
within this state. The Wills court said that:
"The solution of this question [whether service
was properJ depends on what is meant by the
term 'doing business' ... "
''Business is largely the barter, sale, or exchange
of things of value, usually property. Doing business is therefore engaging in such pursuit. The
doing of business involves not only the ownership, possession, or control of property, but such
functions as dealing with others in reference to
the property, the exercise of discretion, the making of business decisions, the execution of contracts. It includes the functions of marketing the
product, by advertising and solicitation, and of
collecting for the sold product. It may conservatiYely be said that whenever an important combination of these functions is being performed,
business is being done."
Heliance on the Wills case to establish that Zale is sub.1ect to service in Utah is surely misplaced-the record
does not show that Zale engaged in the activities ment1uued.

Prudential Fed. Sav.
Ass'n. v. William L.
Perera Assoc., 16 Utah 2d 365, 401 P.2d 439 ( 1965),
also cited by Hill, involved service of process on the
l"tah Secretary of State, where no agent of defendant
liJUld be served in Utah. The trial court had found that
thr c!Pf endant was "doing business" within the State of

13

Utah, having entered the state for the express purp0,
of supervising construction of a building in Utah whir
defendant had designed. This court set out the natur
and extent of the defendant's activities in Utah an<l cu 11
eluded that, "[a}ll of this constitutes such a plethora 11
evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that tL
defendant , ..·as doing business in Ctah that it seems a:·
most incredible that the point was raised on cross-ap
peal." The court said that service was proper based uprr'.
the facts of the case.

POINT 3
TI-IE TRIAL COURT PUOPERL Y FOl'\IJ
TH.AT DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
NOT "DOING BUSINESS" IN THE STATE
OF UTAH BASED UPON THE OllAL ARGl
l\IENT AND EYIDENCE PRESENTED.
A. Zale does not fall within the standards of a111
test of "doing business" in this jurisdiction.
The Trial Court examined the pleadings, indu\!
ing the interrogatories and responses, and requests for
admissions and responses, and the affidavit of the pres1
dent of Zale, and concluded that Zale was not doing
business within the State of Utah and could not then ht
sened with process in this jurisdiction.
". . . Plaintiff has the burden of affirmat!reh
showing that defendant was doing business w1thP
the state." JVestern Gas Appliances v. Serrr
Inc., supra, citing Mayer v. Wright, 234 foi1::
1158, 15 N.,V.2d 268.
14

This has not been done.

Appellant contends that "even if the view that the
is 'doing business' in Utah should not preiail, this court is not required to reject jurisdiction ...
liecause the test of ... 'doing business' ... has ... underrrone much change toward liberalization ... " ( llrief, p.
I'
Ji). Appellant cites a wealth of authority for the propmition that the test has been liberalized, none of which
indicates that the court may retain jurisdiction even
though a defendant be found not to be doing business
11 ithin the meaning of the statutory authority for serYice
,,f process. Apparently Hill urges upon this Court adopl10n of the Federal test of "doing business" as enunciated
111 lnternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
1ili S.Ct. 154 (1945), which had its origins in Perkins v.
ilenr;uct Consol. ]}fining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct.
na (1952). Appellant's brief presents ample evidence
11f the predilictions of at least one other jurisdiction:
"[l}t is 'apparent that South Carolina now resolves
the jurisdictional question in the terms employed in the
opinion in International Shoe'." Szanty v. Beech AirL'l'aft Corp., 237 F'.Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965) quoting
Shealy v. Challanger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102, 106 (4th
Cir. 1962). But see, Springs Cotton Mills v. Machine, rr1ff, Inc., 156 F.Supp. 372 (W.D.S.C. 1957), cited by
appellant, (Brief, p. 30) :
":\Ierely because the defendant has had business
solicited for it by another does not bring the defendant within the orbit of 'doing business' in
that state."
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This court has recogniz.ed the constitutional imperatJ 1,
set forth in International Shoe, but has not expres);
adopted the International Shoe test of "doing busine1)
JV cstern Gas Appliance v. Servel, Inc., supra, at p. U.i:l
"[TJhe mere presence here of an officer of a for
eign corporation will not subject it to suit ..
* * * "l The] term 'presence' is 'used n1erelr t
syboliz.e those activities of the corporation's agtri
within the state which courts will deem to sati11
the demands of due process.' " Citing I nlem
tional Shoe.
And, 1llcGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc., 123 Utah
256 P.2d 703, 705 (1953):

!tit·

"Beyond . . . solicitation the activity to conk
jurisdiction must be of sufficient substance and·
such scope and variety as would lead a court·
last resort to conclude that immuniz.ation of tli
foreign corporation against the power of u1.:
forum would be unrealistic, unreasonable and.
Yehicle for opprossing or meting out injmtice 1,
our own local citizens."
Even though the liberal "doing business" test of Inter·
national Shoe were adopted, it appears that maintenanc:
of jurisdiction in the instant case would be ina ppropriatr
in light of the language of the International Shoe cast
" 'Presence' in the state ... has never been douht
cd when the acti,·ities of the corporation tk
ha Ye not only been continuous and systemat:.
but also give· rise to the liabilities sued 011. ·
(Emphasis added.)
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\uthmg appears of record to show that the acts com-

·1lained
of took place in this jurisdiction, or that the
I
iiabilities sued on arose in this jurisdiction; to the contrary, all evidence points to acts or omissions without
lhis jurisdiction, but within the jurisdiction of the State
nf Alaska. Appellant informs us that "one court has apt arently been willing to abandon even the requirement
of a minimum contact."(Brief, p. 24) . The court said, in
tirnling sufficient minimum contact:

"\Ye are not prepared to say, on the basis of what
this record shows ... that there was no projection
of appellee's corporation presence into the District of Columbia adequate to support jurisdiction over a claim of this character. On the contrary, we think the presence was sufficiently tangible to require appellee, properly summoruled,
to answer a District resident in a District Court
for an alleged dereliction having its immediate
impact in the District." Washington v. Hospital
Serv. Plan, 345 F.2d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Appellant asserts that jurisdiction over Zale may be had
liy rirtue of the presence of a wholly owned subsidiary
rneorporated in this state, citing for authority Szanty v.
Bt'ech Aircraft Co., supra, which applied the lnternatwnal Shoe test, and Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v .
.lloone.IJ Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1964),
11 hich applied a Florida "long-arm" statute:
"Fla.Stat. 47.16 (2), F.S.A.: 'Any person, firm
or corporation which through brokers, jobbers,
wholesalers or distributors sells, consigns, or
leases by any means whatsoever, tangible or. intangible personal property, to any person, firm
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or corporation in this state, shall be
presumed
be operating, conducting,
m or carrymg on a business venture in this sta'."
Florida Laws 1957, ch. 57-747, l." (Quoted
p. 138 n.9.)
·
The instant action was not the result of serrice p:,
suant to the Utah "long-arm" statute, Section
C.C.A. 1953, as amended, et. seq., nor could it be,
none of the acts complained of occurred in this state
expressly required by that statute.
Appellant correctly states that "the court plal·.
great emphasis on the management contract between tl.
foreign and domestic corporation," in Kane v.
267 :F.Supp. 709 (E.D.Pa. 1967), an admiralty ca11
The corporation upon which service was made was n1
a "wholly-owned subsidiary" of the defendant, but tlu·
error makes little difference, since as the court stated:
"The [Ship's Agency} Agreement requirrn:
.:\for-mack Lthe agent} to 'take all necessary ster
to protect the interest of the vessel in connectir:
* * *with all claims that may be made against ti
vessel,' is broad enough to authorize
to accept service of process . . ."
1

No such agreement or agency has been shown in the 1L
stant case.
Appellant argues that the subsidiaries of Zale ar:
mere alter egos ,and that this court should examine tli:
relationship, based upon Chicago, M.8$St.P. Ry. r. Jfii,
neapolis Civic Assn., 247 U.S. 490, 62 L.E<l.
(1918), a case which examined parent-subsidiary corp
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relationships as an adjunct to a rate regulation dis·rnte, and Pergmnent v. Frazier, 93 F.Supp. 9 (E.D.
1
\[ich. I U.1!9), which applied a .Michigan Statute:
rate

.. · In all cases where suit is brought against a
foreign corporation, process may be served upon
any officer or agent of such corporation within
this state, and any person representing such corpomtion in any capacity, shall be deemed an
agent within the meaning of this section.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 27.761, Stats.Ann.,
Comp.Laws 1948 § 613.31."
The instructive discussion in 73 Harvard L.Rev. 909
:it page 932-33" commended to this court by Appellant
1 Brief, pp. 29-30) sheds no light on this case since each
l·a:..e cited as authority was decided on the factual basis
11f eridence before the court. Bal01· v. Boosey q; Hawkes,
Ud.,80 F.Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); " ... it is clear
from these undisputed facts that the New York subsidiJJT is acting here as a mere agent for the English corporation .... " Duraladd Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court,
Cal.App.2d 226, 285 P.2d 699 (1955); " ... it is
:1pparent that Duraladd maintained a continuous course
! business with the California company and continued
:ifter the original installation of the assembly equipment
tu maintain an interest in seeing that the assembly was
1lone properly .... " H. F. Campbell Const. Co. v. Palumbit, 347 Mich. 340, 79 N.W.2d 915 (1956); the
court, applying the International Shoe test, said that a
r·rinsignmcnt agreement with the corporation ·whereby
ill goods shipped into the jurisdiction were to be stored,
lield and insured in the name of the defendant, consti11

11
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t.ute<l "doing business." United States v. Buffalo
ing
Co., 155 F.Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. l!J.)U
"It is established by decision of the Circuit as 11 e1
as of the Supreme Court that the mere
tion, through stock ownership of interlocking Ji
rectorates, of a corporate subsidiary, dues nut
itself bring the parent within the j uris<lict 111 1.
where the subsidiary does business. Cannon JJ1c
Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. 1925, 267 U.S.
45 S.Ct. 250, 69 L.Ed. 634; Echeverry v. Ki!
logy
Supply Co., 2 Cir., Hl.J.!J, !ii
F.2d 900. * * * '[ll]oth opinions are at
ll
distinguish between corporate separation mamfested by business ararngements, though forma:
and circumscribed, and a separation which ,,
purely fictitious. This case falls within the latltr
category. All of the corporate entities have be·
come parties to agreements in which each, to se
cure the continuance of Buffalo as a going bm.·
ness, has become responsible for the debt of on1
of them-they have so intertwined their obliga·
tions as to make impracticable the resolution 11:
the controversy in a suit against any of them i11
dividually."
,:
1

Notwithstanding that the respondent has not beeL
shown to have met the requirements of any test of "d 11•
ing business," this court could still apply the "minimw11
contacts" test of the International Shoe case. ln th3
event, the court could find that respondent does not ban
"minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of tbt
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play an:
substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Wasliirii:
ton, supra.
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It must be remembered that appellant complains of

or omissions which occurred in the State of Alaska
;it a time when he was a resident of Alaska employed by
:in Alaska Corporation; that all persons who would have
dired knowledge of the claimed acts or omissions are
likely resident within the State of Alaska; that any
claimed corporate presence of Zale within the State of
nah is so miniscule that to cause Zale to attempt to defend the action in this jurisdiction would be offensive to
lhe "traditional notions of fair-play anJ substantial justice"; and that this court has not previously subscribed to
the notion that jurisdiction may be had over a foreign
l"1rporation which does no business in the state, but
11hid1 may have fortuitously located an employee in this
1tate.
,ids

B. Zale's activities within this jurisdiction fall
within a specific statutory exemption from "doing business."
Section 16-10-102 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, prorides in part that:
" ... a foreign corporation shall not be considered
to be transacting business in this state ... by rearnn of carrying on in this state any one or more of
the following activities:
( b) Holding meetings of its directors or shareholders or carr,ying on other activities concerning
its internal affairs." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant requested through discovery procedure
nformation regarding the activities of the person who
11 as sen·ed with process in Utah for Zale:
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"State fully and completely the duties, functii,
and responsibilities performed by .l\lr. Hankir.
regard to all off ices or positions he holds
Zale Corporation and any of the Zale StoreGtah." ( R. 4 paragraph 3.b.)
·
Hespondent answered:
"Richard Hankin is supervisor of certain Z;
Stores in the western part of the United Statt,
(R. 13 paragraph 3.b.)
Apparently .Nlr. Rankin's location in Utah is merely
convenient central location from which to maintain
ordination of activities of the various western
aries. That is to say, he is performing internal corpor::
coordination.

1

Appellant also requested information regard1:
Zale' s Security Division's activities in U tab (H. .). pa1
graph 6) . Respondent's reply indicates that the Secu:·r
Division has performed certain duties in Utah--aga:
economy of scale achieved in strictly internal matters•
obviating the need of a separate security division i
each subsidiary corporation. (R. 13 paragraph 01.
Now here is it shown that the activities of any tr,
ployee of Zale within the State of Utah have been otht
wise than purely internal affairs, within the meaning
Section 16-10-102, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
CONCLUSION

Respondent Zale Corporation respectfully
that the trial court correctly granted the Motion to f1 ·
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miss. an<l that this court should affirm that decision, on
the basis that the trial court heard oral argument and

namined the pleadings in determining whether Zale
"doing business" within the state, and found that it
11 as not; that having so found ,it properly concluded
rhat Zale could not be served with process in the State
,,f Utah; that the only evidence of record reasonably
, 1ipports the decision; and that no evidence was pre!·nted which would indicate "doing business" within the
111eaning of the authority cited by either party.
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